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THE POWER OF THOUGHT 
ALEX MURRAY AND THANOS ZARTALOUDIS 
 
This special issue emerged from a one-day symposium held on the work of Giorgio 
Agamben at the School of Law, Birkbeck, in July 2007 titled ‘Between Language and 
History: on the work of Giorgio Agamben’. The impetus behind that gathering, as 
with this publication, was the narrowness of the secondary criticism that had emerged 
on the work of Agamben in the Anglo-American academy in particular. The 
reception, in its haste to draw Agamben into narrow disciplinary fields such as 
political philosophy, law or Holocaust studies, at best denied the breadth and depth of 
his thought, at worst comprehensively misread it. Agamben has described his own 
critical approach to philosophy as a ‘mosaic’, having ‘no specificity, no proper 
territory, it is within literature, within art or science or theology or whatever, it is this 
element which contains a capability to be developed (Agamben, 2002).  
Any engagement with Agamben’s thought must take seriously the potentiality 
of thought, searching beyond the staid articulations of ‘law’ or any other area. The 
articles gathered here share as their interest the study of law, but that is hardly in a 
narrow disciplinary sense. If ‘law’ is understood as a system of decision-making that 
draws a line between what is of juridical relevance and what is not, the juridical and 
the non-juridical, it grounds on this distinction its systematic contour and its internal 
rationality. Yet legal theory, and more generally thought, cannot and should not 
remain within the enclosure of the internal rationality of law. That would simply be a 
bad idea. Thinking about the law more generally or legal theory in particular has as its 
object possibility (potentiality). Between the traditional and important questions of 
‘what is law?’ and what ‘should be the law?’ lies the question ‘what can the law be?’ 
It is this latter question that forms the ground of thinking the law, where thinking 
searches for ‘escape routes’, ‘potentialities’, ‘ways of being’ and so forth (see Schütz, 
2000) If thought is not to be narrowed down into one discipline or into the normative 
or merely positive questions of the legal system, then thought can be reconceived as 
the experience, for it is an empiricism, of the perpetual temptation in Western 
thinking to confine itself within ‘law’ or ‘politics’ as well as the equally frequent 
temptation to posit itself as a law a such.  
Law and thought, and philosophical thought in particular, share a long history 
of mutual irritation as well as attempts to fuse the two into one. In the latter case, law 
is often portrayed, explicitly or implicitly, as ‘more than law’, as ‘wisdom’ or social 
knowledge and normativity, while ‘philosophical thought’ is frequently portrayed as 
entailing a normative content or a juridico-political ‘responsibility’. Instead, it is 
argued here that law and thought must maintain themselves separately and avoid 
fusion and, above all, it is suggested that apart from showing the exposition of each 
other’s manoeuvres, any attempt to turn law into a responsibility or knowledge-centre 
at large or equally any attempt to turn philosophical thought into a trans-legal, trans-
regional domain, are misplaced.  
One of the key problems in legal theories of late modernity, but also much 
earlier, is the juridification of thought as such. In such juridification the model of 
thought becomes judgement and a legal understanding of responsibility. Instead, with 
Agamben’s work in mind, thought and life, more generally, are to be understood as 
distinct from the law’s realm of triumphant self-consecration. The fact that Agamben 
does not juridify thought, reducing it to judgement about this or that, a weighing of 
pros and cons, a problem-solving technique, is the main reason why the, by now, 
increasingly juridified legal and non-legal theorists, cannot appreciate the gesture of 
his work without feeling threatened conceptually and perhaps, let us say it, 
professionally also. 
Agamben’s work ultimately forces us to observe law-making within a larger 
apparatus of a state of exception that has become the rule, permanently, and that 
attempts to regulate legal decision-making, politics, economics and social life in 
general. Agamben’s recent work exposes a network of neo-governmentality acting ‘in 
the name’ of constant crises and survival, which seeks to control our ways of being 
and which is grounded in the institutional integration of life as such. Ultimately it is 
this attempt to rethink the law in relation to being, that is, to think law (also) as an 
ontological problem that forces Western liberal distinctions and criteria of 
responsibility into question, which gives Agamben’s thought its efficacy in a world 
where, for example, legal rights are consistently eroded in the name of those very 
rights.  
The method of ‘philosophical archaeology’ he outlines in his contribution to 
this volume is demonstrative of an attempt to engage thought for the present, to take a 
contemporary problematic – let us say spurious accusations of terrorism – and to see 
them not as a new, knee-jerk response to global politics, but as a symptom of a 
juridico-political system that is based upon forms of ‘exclusive inclusion’. That is, a 
system that is based not simply on a distinction between those included and those 
excluded (who can then demand to be included), but more crucially on the production 
of waste, dehumanised beings that are reduced to survival or that are killed as 
biopolitical, crises-managing, collateral casualties. Hence the focus of Agamben’s 
work is with what is left behind social and legal care-taking, crises-managing 
procedures, the evidence of which can be located both in discourse as well as in 
action. Political, economic and legal artifact-relationships, in this manner of 
understanding, condition a particular mode of existence as waste. Hence, as Anton 
Schütz has argued, the point at which the parallels of diverging rationalities in charge 
of conduct and meaning intersect is ‘located in the experience of historically 
manufactured versions, side-version, diminutions, of human life’ (2000, pp. 120-1). 
This archaeological method is a consistent feature of Agamben’s thought. 
From early works such as Language and Death, Agamben has sought to explore 
foundational tensions in Western thought. Since the 1970s Agamben has preoccupied 
himself with such closure of thought in terms of so-called foundational paradoxes that 
define being and action only negatively and which regulate power as ‘fruit to pick’. 
Yet this has never been a process of dull historicism, instead it has always been an 
attempt to encounter the structures of ‘our situation’ through the past in order to 
demonstrate their ultimate contradictions and ‘inoperativity’. The structural 
inoperativity of these formations plays itself out in the contemporary in ways which 
should never be seen as ‘new’ or ‘unprecedented’ but as indicative of social, legal and 
political forms that have been emptied out of any value through their inherent 
contradiction. This diagnosis, the declaration that ‘politics has entered a lasting 
eclipse’ has been misread by those who see themselves, whether knowingly or not, as 
apologists for liberal democracy, as a form of nihilism. Yet if Agamben’s own 
thought is read correctly it appears as nothing less than a joyous attempt to profane 
the inane spectacular nature of our own culture. 
The spectacularisation of ‘our’ culture and social life, as well as of our legal 
and political subjectivities, has resulted in everything taking the form of a 
representation. Praxis or action is reduced, in this sense, to a world separable from 
our everyday lives and in this world, whose liturgy is performed by the mass media, 
neo-governmental oikonomia, operative in politics and law as much as in the modern 
economy, render neo-governmentality as an absolute and irresponsible sovereign 
power governing the social or life more generally, as if from an invisible thread, 
compromising every thing with everything else. The continuing references to the 
sacrality of human life, the so-called trans-regional universality of human rights and 
so forth, are mere confirmations of the spectacularisation of legal and political 
categories as such. Jurists and political theorists tend to find hope in the so-called 
transcendence of the humanity implied in human rights, while for us things are less 
hopeful in this manner. What fills us with hope is the extent of how devastating our 
current situation is. 
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